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Russian Federation: Apparat 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
CABINET 
For the government, 2001 could be a good year: More money... 
At a cabinet meeting held on 20 September, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail 
Kasyanov announced that the 2002 budget will be reviewed, and that, in light of 
this year's successful economy, it could be increased in practically all areas. 
(ORT, 20 Sep 01; via www.ortv.ru) Kasyanov expects that the growth in Russia's 
gross domestic product will register at 5.5 percent (with industrial output growing 
by 5.8 percent and agricultural output by 7 percent), rather than the planned 4 
percent. The discussion of the precise changes to the budget was scheduled for 
an extraordinary meeting of the cabinet on Tuesday, 25 September. 
 
Kasyanov noted that economic growth is important "not only for maintaining the 
balance of the federal budget, but also for maintaining the balance of regional 
budgets." In particular, the government will be able "to increase the wages of 
budget-financed sectors." (ITAR-TASS, 0730 GMT, 20 Sep 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0920, via World News Connection) 
 
JUDICIARY 
... more judges... 
According to Presidential Deputy Chief of Staff Dmitry Kozak, one area that will 
benefit from the larger 2002 budget is Russia's judiciary branch. Whereas, in 
2001, the judiciary budget was only R11 billion, in 2002 the amount will be 
increased to R18 billion. Kozak explained that this will make it possible to raise 
the salaries of judges, repair existing buildings and build new ones, and buy 
housing for judges. Priority should go, he suggested, to improving "working 
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conditions for district courts and judges, who handle most cases but work in the 
worst conditions." In 2002, district judges will have assistants assigned to them; 
in the future, judges at other levels may get assistants as well. (ITAR-TASS; 
1828 GMT, 10 Sep 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0910, via World News Connection) 
 
Conditions are particularly difficult in the Chechen Republic, where -- in 
November of 2000 -- 12 regional courts and a Supreme Court were re-
established and re-staffed by judges who had been forced to resign and flee after 
the 1996 Khasavyurt cease-fire agreement. Three thousand administrative cases 
and hundreds of criminal ones have been examined over the past year and, 
according to Rossiyskaya gazeta, trust in the courts has strengthened over this 
period. At the same time, the special state protection afforded to federal judges 
and members of their families under the Law on the Status of Judges is little 
more than a theoretical concept, and judges in Chechnya work at their own risk. 
Their salaries -- 4,000 to 5,000 rubles a month -- are one-third of what drivers 
and secretaries at the prosecutor's office receive. In addition, the judges do not 
enjoy the additional guarantees and benefits bestowed upon workers of the 
executive branch operating in Chechnya. Nor do the judges have bodyguards -- 
and this is in a region where one judge was recently beaten up right outside his 
home, a court administration chairman was shot while driving in his car, and 
another city court judge receives regular telephone threats at home and work. 
 
Chechnya's judiciary conditions do surpass those of other regions in technical 
backup -- but this is only because computers and 10 cars were received as a gift 
from the United Nations High Commission. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 11 Sep 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0912, via World News Connection) Of course it is not 
surprising that judges would receive a smaller salary than secretaries or drivers -- 
after all, they can expect to make much more in bribes. And the assertion, oft-
repeated by Russian politicians, that bribe-taking could be curbed by increased 
salaries, is questionable.  
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REGIONS 
... fewer alphabets... 
Russia's favorite regional renegade -- Tatarstan -- has been stalling too long on 
bringing the republic's constitution in line with the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation. Tatar President Mintimer Shaimiev had promised to make the 
required changes after the March 2001 elections, but half a year later -- and only 
a month before the deadline for the adjustment -- representatives of the 
republican parliament and members of the presidential administration have 
reached no agreement. (IEWS RUSSIAN REGIONAL REPORT, 29 Aug 01) 
 
Now the stakes have been raised with a coordinated attack on Tatarstan's 
decision to change the national writing system from Cyrillic to Latin script. 
(Background information: The Tatars had used runes in ancient times, and 
Arabic script from the tenth century until 1927, when the Latin script was 
introduced. Latin script was in use until 1939 -- in those years there was even 
talk of adopting Russian to Latin script, so that, after the worldwide victory of the 
working class, it would be easier for the proletariat of all nations to communicate. 
Since the government's decision two years ago to reintroduce the Latin script, 70 
Tatar schools already have switched. 
 
On 14 September, an open letter urging Tatarstan's State Council to abandon its 
plans to Latinize was published in Rossiyskaya gazeta. The letter was signed by 
37 members of Tatarstan's cultural and political elite, 29 members of the Yardem 
Mosque in Moscow and 56 residents of Yoshkar-Ola, Saratov, Nizhny Novgorod, 
Omsk, Perm, Ufa and Ulyanovsk. They warned that a change would be "[a] 
threat [...] to the literacy and educational level of the next generation, to access to 
knowledge and literature, to scientific research, to the creative process, to the 
dialogue between scientists, specialists and public figures, and hence to the 
development of the Tatar ethnic culture outside the borders of our historic 
homeland. Enormous amounts will be spent on new textbooks and the 
development of teaching methodologies, on translating books and retraining 
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teachers, and eventually on the replacement of advertising signs and street 
signs. Some people will write in the new style, others in the old style.... Why this 
rupture, why this schism? [...] Let us develop rather than destroy, improve rather 
than redraft our beloved Tatar language! Let us act in such a way that our 
children will understand what their fathers and mothers were writing about!" 
(ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 14 Sep 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0914, via World News 
Connection) 
 
The letter -- which was later pronounced a forgery by members of the State 
Council of Tatarstan and some of those whose names appeared in the 
signatures (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 21 Sep 01; via www.rferl.org) -- was timed to 
coincide with an international "Language and Culture" conference held at the 
Moscow Academy of Sciences between 14 and 17 September. The 500 scholars 
"from various countries" who attended the conference also criticized the decision, 
explaining that it was not only a pointless move, but also one that could create 
many difficulties, especially for the elderly, and even lead to widespread illiteracy. 
(ORT, 17 Sep 01; via www.ortv.ru)  
 
Then, on 18 September, in an unprecedented manifestation of keeping a finger 
on the pulse of national events (and a chokehold on the throat of the Tatar drive 
for autonomy), a group of State Duma deputies suggested amending the law on 
state languages to require the Cyrillic alphabet to be used, except in cases where 
another alphabet is authorized by federal law. Apparently refreshed by their 
recent summer vacation, the deputies even managed to prepare these 
corrections to the "Law on the Languages of the People of Russia" by the next 
day -- the first meeting of the Duma. (ORT, 19 Sep 01; via www.ortv.ru) 
 
The politicians, however, seemed to take to heart the Russian saying that you 
can't spoil kasha with too much butter. They criticized supporters of Latinization 
for explaining that the Latin script is more conducive to Turkic languages and 
declared that this is a political matter that has nothing to do with linguistic 
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subtleties. They claimed that the drive towards Latinization was a manifestation 
of globalization and asserted that Turkey has been trying to extend its influence 
into the Turkic members of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the 
republics within the Russian Federation. (ORT, 20 Sep 01; via www.ortv.ru) This 
was reminiscent of a statement made by Sergey Dorenko on the Russian Central 
TV channel two years ago that "if the whole Russian Federation switched to the 
Latin alphabet, Tatarstan would decide to introduce Cyrillic." (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, 28 Sep 99; via www.rferl.org) 
 
MEDIA 
...and fewer allowances for oligarchs 
Meanwhile, in the light of the events of 11 September and consequent plans, 
day-by-day updates on the lifting of the Kursk, and Russia's victories (and 
selective defeats) in Chechnya that have monopolized the nation's attention, the 
Kremlin once again has taken an interest in the media. On 12 September, a 
member of the Duma's security committee, Gennady Gudkov, told journalists that 
he has "sufficient information to prove that the mass media have launched a 
campaign against the Russian president." In particular, Gudkov asserted that 
well-known media magnate Boris Berezovsky has provided financial support to 
publications which print "compromising material" against the president. 
Furthermore, he added that "certain forces in the person of foreign special 
services" have a stake in destabilizing the economic and political situation in 
Russia. To achieve this, he claimed, since last April they have been "feeding" 
information to certain media outlets that links the Russian president with various 
scandalous stories. Discrediting the power organs -- and in particular, the 
Federal Security Service and the Federal Protection Service -- is another goal. In 
response to journalists' questions concerning the reaction of the president, 
Gudkov replied that "the president reacts to these attacks like a real man and 
refuses to comment on them," but that his own duty, "as a deputy, as a 
representative of the State Duma's security committee [is] to inform the country's 
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[population] promptly." (RIA, 1236 GMT, 12 Sep 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0912, via 
World News Connection) 
 
And of course, when Berezovsky is mentioned, fellow media oligarch Vladimir 
Gusinsky cannot be far away. On Monday, 10 September, the Moscow City 
Court canceled a 17 April ruling of the Savelovsky Municipal Court on Gusinsky's 
action against Deputy Prosecutor General Vasily Kolmogorov. Gusinsky had 
submitted that a phrase used by Kolmogorov in a letter to the State Duma on 5 
July 2000, and subsequently reprinted in Komsomol'skaya pravda on 8 July 
2000, was an insult to his honor and should be recanted in the mass media. 
Specifically, the paper said that "the criminal activities of Gusinsky have been 
confirmed by impartial evidence, testimonies of witnesses, examination results 
and other materials of the case." Konstantin Agadzhanov, a representative of the 
Prosecutor General's Office, said that, in reviewing the case, it was determined 
that Gusinsky's rights were not breeched in Kolmogorov's letter, and that only 
facts -- as determined by an investigation -- were stated. Additionally, 
Agadzhanov reminded the Moscow City Court that Gusinsky currently is facing 
charges on another criminal case. (ITAR-TASS, 1307 GMT, 10 Sep 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0910, via World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Walter Jackson 
 
Russia's response to 11 September: A moving target 
"Dear George, 
I am shocked by reports about the tragic events that happened on the territory of 
the United States today.... The whole international community must unite in the 
fight against terrorism. V. Putin" (ITAR-TASS, 1901 GMT, 11 Sep 01; via ISI 
Emerging Markets) 
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The events of 11 September have been played out on TV screens the world over 
and the reaction across the globe has ranged from understandable outrage to 
glee (in "the usual cases"). Moscow policymakers made (tactical?) adjustments 
as the crisis unfolded. Since the day of the attack, Russian foreign policy has 
been buffeted by considerations that have evolved over time. 
 
The official Moscow stance of the events of 11 September consisted of sharp 
rhetoric condemning the attacks and the attackers along with their sponsors. 
However, a brief capsule of comments reflects the evolutionary process of 
Russian policy development. Following Putin's original condemnation, his 
comments became vague in terms of the role Russia might play in the "war 
against terrorism." He has called for increased cooperation, meetings and 
consultations. (RADIO MAYAK, 1400 GMT, 12 Sep 01; via ISI Emerging 
Markets) Putin provided a great deal of rhetoric, but little substance in terms of 
specific areas of cooperation. 
 
Putin's most senior lieutenants have given a little more detail, but have 
highlighted different approaches. Statements from the defense ministry offered 
limited clues to the Russian approach. Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov stated on 
18 September that Russia has offered to provide the US with "vital information 
that could establish the true identity of those guilty of the terrorist acts in New 
York and Washington." (BBC, 18 Sep 01; via ISI Emerging Markets) Information 
is one thing, but Gen. Anatoly Kvashnin, chief of the General Staff of the Army, 
made it clear during a visit to Tajikistan that "Russia has never taken part in US 
military actions and has no intention of doing so." (ITAR-TASS, 1918 GMT, 19 
Sep 01; via ISI Emerging Markets) 
 
Finally, the Russian leadership has sent conflicting messages to CIS states. 
Originally, Moscow displayed its displeasure at Uzbekistan's initiative in offering 
bases to the US, a fact that forced Uzbekistan to backtrack for a while. 
Subsequently, Igor Ivanov stated in a television interview on 19 September that 
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Russia would not put pressure on CIS partners and that those countries should 
decide for themselves whether to allow US bases/strikes from their territories. At 
the same time, senior Russian leaders including Kvashnin have been dispatched 
to the Central Asian republics, probably to ensure that Moscow is the clear leader 
in participation in any US coalition. 
 
Russian officials continued to make other conflicting statements throughout the 
week. During a visit by Ivanov to Washington, the defense minister again 
provided ambiguous statements regarding Russia's role in the pending war 
against terrorism. (CNN, 21 Sep 01; via www.cnn.com) However, he reiterated 
the claim that Russia has been fighting its own war against terrorism in 
Chechnya (a notion surprisingly backed by US Secretary of State Colin Powell). 
Ivanov also confirmed that Russia would not stop Central Asian states from 
cooperating with the US.  
 
During his first live address to the Russian people on 24 September, Putin 
outlined what specific assistance Moscow was prepared to offer the US-led 
alliance. First, Russia would provide intelligence information to support the US. 
Second, Russia would open its airspace to humanitarian aid aircraft. (RUSSIAN 
PUBLIC TV [ORT], 1700 GMT, 24 Sep 01; via BBC Monitoring) Other actions, if 
any, were not mentioned. Russia has reconfirmed its longstanding support to the 
Northern Alliance in Afghanistan (which, indeed, Moscow had a hand in forming). 
(EKHO MOSKVY, 0600 GMT, 23 Sep 01; via BBC Monitoring) 
 
It is still too early to determine precisely what role the Russians will play in the 
coming efforts against international terrorism. However, nothing is without cost 
and for the Russians to have any role in helping the US, Moscow will want 
something in return. Several possibilities stand out as longstanding Russian 
issues with the West: 
 
1. Major concessions on National Missile Defense (NMD) and NATO expansion. 
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Russia will certainly want to begin specific negotiations on the future of National 
Missile Defense. Moscow has long opposed the development of NMD and will 
make every effort to exploit the situation in an effort to get the project shelved 
indefinitely. It also will ask for a halt to NATO expansion. If NATO were to 
succumb, it would be at the expense of the Baltic states and the momentum built 
up by their sponsors for fast-track membership. Bulgaria and Romania would be 
disadvantaged even further. 
 
2. A completely free hand in dealing with the Chechens. 
Secretary of State Powell already seems to have agreed with Ivanov that the 
situation in Chechnya could be viewed as part of a counter-terrorism offensive. 
(CNN, 21 Sep 01) It would follow logically that the Russians could pursue an 
even more aggressive campaign to "purge" the Chechens. Although the 
Russians, in any case, have not received more than a slap on the wrist from the 
international community for their excesses against the Chechens, they have had 
to answer critics on occasion. 
 
Another area of advantage is increased stature for the Russian intelligence 
services. The US is seeking support from Russian human intelligence (HUMINT). 
HUMINT is considered by most analysts to be the most important intelligence 
source for combating terrorism. (JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, 21 Sep 01; via 
lexis-nexis) HUMINT is crucial to counter-terrorism because many terrorist cells 
don't use advanced technology and are therefore highly resistant to high-tech 
collection efforts. Because US intelligence services reduced HUMINT focus on 
Asia in the early 1990s (JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, 12 Oct 00; via lexis-nexis), 
planners preparing to conduct operations in Afghanistan and perhaps elsewhere 
have a real shortfall of on-the-ground HUMINT operatives. It is believed that 
Russia has extensive networks of HUMINT developed and maintained as a result 
of both its presence in Central Asia and its war in Afghanistan. These existing 
networks could prove to be critical as a starting point for US efforts to track and 
attack bin Laden and the al Qaeda network. Russia can increase its visibility and 
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importance on the international stage by becoming the focal point for these 
efforts. The Russians also can pressure the international community for 
additional aid and credits for their struggling economy. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Bethel 
 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attack against the US, expressions of world 
support flow in, including, in some instances, offers of the use of military forces 
and bases. The use of certain Central Asian bases and airspace as part of the 
US retaliatory strikes against Osama bin Ladin, al Qaeda cells and Taliban forces 
has accelerated an existing US military engagement policy with some CIS states. 
Although giving rhetorical support to the US "war on terrorism," Putin is pulling 
the strings tightly in an attempt to assert control over the amount and type of 
support individual CIS states provide. With regard to Russia's own capabilities, 
details have emerged regarding the proposed modernization of its air force, and 
security has been heightened in the north. Simulated air strikes have been 
carried out against Russia's traditional targets in the north, west and south. 
 
Uzbekistan anti-terrorist support 
As the US begins its deployment of troops and personnel to the region, Central 
Asian states offer various degrees of assistance. Uzbekistan was the first to offer 
support, potentially including bases. Initially, Moscow voiced its displeasure at 
such initiatives by states in what it continues to claim as its Central Asian sphere 
of influence. Subsequently, Putin changed his stance, but, in withdrawing his 
objections, found a way of indicating that Russia's imprimatur was required, by 
stating that the Central Asians were offering support "in coordination" with 
Russia. As things stand now, "Uzbekistan will most likely play the most active 
part in air strikes against Afghanistan." Abdulaziz Kamilov, the Uzbek minister of 
foreign affairs, indirectly confirmed this in an interview with the American 
 11 
newspaper Washington Post. His airfields, inherited from the Turkestan Military 
District, are located a half-hour's flight from Kabul. "It is entirely possible that they 
will be used either for refueling, or for emergency landings of American aircraft." 
Uzbek President Islam Karimov hopes to strengthen ties with NATO, having 
objected to the CIS Collective Security Treaty, and becoming instead one of the 
founding fathers of GUUAM (association of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, 
Azerbaijan and Moldova). (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 18 Sep 01) 
 
Uzbek forces led by General Rasit Dostum have been engaged in the struggle 
against the Afghani Taliban regime, which actively supports Islamic insurgency in 
Uzbekistan. Dzhuma Namangani, leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 
has been made a commander of a 9,000-man-strong Taliban military unit 
allegedly made up of Taliban troops, mercenaries from Pakistan and Arab 
countries, Uzbek extremists and others in the northern Afghan province of 
Takhar. (INTERFAX, 1549 GMT, 18 Sep 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0918, via World 
News Connection) Clearly Uzbekistan understands that it has everything to lose 
if the Taliban movement expands. Throughout the past week much had been 
much written about whether Central Asian states would permit US forces to 
operate on their soil. Following Putin's original objections, Uzbek senior officials, 
including President Karimov, had started to retract their earlier offers of basing, 
leaving the door open for a more wholehearted approach if presented with 
"proof" of bin Laden's culpability. Once Russia withdrew its objections, 
Uzbekistan returned to its earlier offer. Ultimately, after talks with the CIS states, 
Moscow made it clear publicly that each CIS state will decide on its own what 
level of support it provides the US in terms of military basing. However, Moscow 
continues to apply pressure against any substantial US presence in the region. 
 
Two US C-130 aircraft reportedly arrived at a military airfield close to Tashkent 
on 22 September and unloaded various intelligence-gathering and technical 
equipment, plus approximately 100 US servicemen. (INTERFAX, 1753 GMT, 22 
Sep 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0922, via World News Connection) Questions remain: 
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What further assistance to the US effort will Tashkent and others in the region 
provide? Will Moscow continue to apply pressure to limit such cooperation? 
 
Russian military current and future readiness 
Russia is reported to be planning to modernize 80 percent of its military aircraft 
before 2005. Army General Anatoly Kornukov stated "In the past 10 years, the 
Air Force has virtually received not a single aircraft...within the next few years we 
will have to replace practically the whole fleet of ground support, bomber, 
reconnaissance and military support aircraft...we are now putting our main 
emphasis on modernization." Kornukov said that the Russian Air Force in the 
future will have three types of operational aircraft -- light, medium and heavy, two 
types of transport aircraft, two types of missile systems short- and long-range, 
and five types of radar systems. He also stated that contracts had already been 
let to industry. (ITAR-TASS, 1618 GMT, 15 Sep 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0915, via 
World News Connection) This approach resembles the US military concept of 
reducing the types of military aircraft. How Moscow will pay for this immense 
modernized infrastructure in light of other competing economic priorities remains 
to be seen. 
 
Forces on alert/exercise cancelled 
Of late, Russian military forces have tightened security measures in the 
Murmansk and Leningrad regions, keeping the anti-submarine warfare ship 
Admiral Chabanenko and heavy missile cruiser Pyotr Veliky underway in the 
Barents Sea. Ground and air forces increased their alert status and security was 
tightened around nuclear facilities and other important state facilities in larger 
Russian cities. At Washington's request following the terrorist attack on the US, 
the Russian defense ministry postponed the 37th Air Army exercises on 12 
September. The Russian exercise includes simulated TU-95MS and TU-22 air 
strikes against (Russia's traditional targets in the) Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic 
theaters. (ITAR-TASS, 1548, 1556 &1942 GMT, 11 Sep 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0911, via World News Connection) By 14 September, Russia was ready to 
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conclude the final phase of the exercise. Three TU-22MZ bombers (flying over 
Russian territory) fired five air-to-surface missiles against targets in the Pacific. 
TU-160 and TU-95 strategic bomber participation was cancelled. (ITAR-TASS, 
0639 GMT, 14 Sep 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0914, via World News Connection) 
 
INTERFAX-Military News Agency (MNA) merge 
The Russian Military News Agency has merged with Interfax to create a broader 
base for dissemination of Russian and CIS armed forces information, including 
military actions, exercises, and reform; weapons testing; and arms sales. Major 
General Vladimir Kosarev, the general director of the new agency, stated that the 
objective was to "cover as systematically, objectively and as professionally as 
possible the developement of the Armed Forces, Interior Ministry, Federal 
Security Service, Federal Border Service, and other security and special services 
within the military-industrial complex." (INTERFAX, 1102 GMT, 12 Sep 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0912, via World News Connection) Whether this is a genuine 
efficiency move, or an effort to exercise control over information dissemination 
more effectively, remains to be seen. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Welcome back! 
After almost a year of watching and waiting, IMF officials finally decided last 
week to reinstate funding to Ukraine; the decision will mean a payment tranche of 
over $375 million from the IMF this year, as well as another $250 million from the 
World Bank. More importantly, the decision will allow the country to fulfill a key 
condition of its agreement struck with the Paris Club in July. A resumption of IMF 
lending means Ukraine now will be allowed to reschedule nearly $600 million of 
debt held by members of the Club over 12 years. In addition, the country's 
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leaders hope that this nod of approval from the IMF will send a positive signal to 
investors. Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh suggested, for example, that the 
importance of this signal "significantly exceeds" the importance of the money 
itself. (UNIAN, 1306 GMT, 21 Sep 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging 
Markets) 
 
Not that the money isn't needed. Despite the fact that it is discussed very little, 
Ukraine continues to be hampered by huge wage arrears to its public sector 
workers. As of early August, the State Statistics Committee listed well over $700 
million in back wages owed to employees by the state (it is unclear whether this 
number included any money owed to the armed forces, but it likely did not). 
While the figure is 12 percent lower than the same period last year, it remains a 
major problem. (WINDOW ON UKRAINE, 21 Sep 01; via ISI Emerging Markets) 
And, of course, the country continues to pay either late or not at all for its gas and 
is attempting to complete the construction of two new nuclear reactors with little 
outside help. 
 
Therefore, the IMF money is important and necessary. However, with a plodding 
bureaucracy, a questionable legal system, rampant corruption and an unstable 
political structure, the country will need more than IMF funding to increase its 
attractiveness to Western investors. The resumption of funding is indeed a 
significant step, but only one of many that will be necessary in the months and 
years to come.  
 
Agreeing to agree again 
When discussing the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine over the latter's 
gas debt, it is necessary to know only two basic sentences. Memorize them here 
now, filling in the blanks accordingly: "The issue of Ukraine's debt to Russia for 
natural gas has been blown out of proportion, and in fact the two countries are 
well along the way to resolving the problem. All of the problems facing Ukraine 
and Russia have been discussed during my recent meeting with Russian 
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President in and all of the agreements achieved in the course of the meeting will 
be arranged during the upcoming negotiations with the Russian Prime Minister, 
which will take place. This proclamation was actually made in July of 1999 by 
President Leonid Kuchma following a meeting with Boris Yel'tsin in Moscow. 
(INTELNEWS, 9 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0709, via World News Connection) It 
was to be the final statement on the problem of Ukraine's gas debt. Except it 
wasn't. It was only the first of many of the same. 
 
Since that time, the countries have signed agreements to formulate agreements, 
while repeatedly announcing their intentions to agree. In August, these same 
tired words were once again recycled. Ukrainian News wrote, "Prime Minister 
Anatoliy Kinakh and Russia's Prime Minister Mikhail Kasanov reached 
agreement on the settlement of Ukraine's debt for Russian natural gas after talks 
in Moscow on 20 August. According to the agreement, the issue of Ukraine's 
debt for natural gas should be resolved through the signing of an inter-
governmental agreement." (UKRAINIAN NEWS, 16 Sep 01; via ISI Emerging 
Markets) This August "agreement" followed the signing of a memorandum -- 
suggesting the need for negotiation and agreement -- last December by Kuchma 
and Vladimir Putin. But, shockingly, the two sides did not agree in September. 
Instead, they announced another meeting in Kyiv on 4-5 October, when a 
"memorandum on settling Ukrainian debt" reportedly will be signed. 
(INTELLINEWS-UKRAINE TODAY, 14 Sep 01) Perhaps the memorandum in 
fact will be signed and will be detailed and enforceable. But perhaps it is more 
likely that in 2002 representatives from the two countries still will be meeting and 
planning to agree. 
 
MOLDOVA 
Economic war? 
Last week, Igor Smirnov, self-proclaimed president of the breakaway Dniestr 
Republic, denounced the decision of Moldovan authorities to change the 
country's custom seals. While a change in a seal might normally mean very little, 
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this change means that the seals held by the republic (per an arrangement made 
with the Moldovan government in 1996) no longer will be valid. From this point 
on, Chisinau controls all customs and border activity. All cargo in and out of the 
Transdniestr region, which was declared previously only to Dniestr, now must be 
declared in Chisinau. To ensure that this occurs, new customs posts have been 
created with money given by the United States as part of a grant to GUUAM 
countries for upgrading customs facilities. 
 
At a recent press conference, the deputy director general of Moldova's customs 
department noted that the new requirements are designed "to introduce uniform 
customs rules in order to put an end to commodity smuggling, corruption, and 
human traffic." Nicolai Makarov suggested that the Dniestr Republic's ability to 
control its border with Ukraine had led to the region becoming "a contraband 
warehouse." He said Ukraine had stopped accepting cargo stamped with the old 
Dniestr seal and that "dozens" of cargo vehicles had been registered so far as 
they delivered goods to the Dniestr region. (INFOTAG, 21 Sep 01; via AZI - 
Independent Journalism Center) 
 
Victor Doras, President Vladimir Voronin's representative, put the situation 
bluntly. "President Vladimir Voronin shall not give up his firm decision to establish 
order on the Republic of Moldova's state border. There's no way back." (IBID.) 
 
The firm decision to establish order comes, of course, as a result of Smirnov's 
inability (or unwillingness) to begin any type of negotiation over Dniestr's status 
with Voronin. It also follows Smirnov's decision to refuse Voronin entry to the 
region, even though the latter was born in the area. These choices have been 
taken personally by the Moldovan president, and he undoubtedly is doing his 
best to show his power. 
 
The World Trade Organization, of which Moldova has just become a member, 
welcomed the customs move and the European Parliament also signaled its 
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support. "Our chief objective," Voronin noted, "is to establish order in exports and 
imports, as is demanded by the World Trade Organization. This is in the interests 
of citizens living on both sides of Dniestr." (INFOTAG, 14 Sep 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-1914, via World News Connection) 
 
Voronin did not stop there, however. A week ago, the president met openly with 
the man attempting to unseat Smirnov as head of the Dniestr region in an 
upcoming election. Aleksandr Radchenko, a member of the Communist Party, 
met with Voronin on 14 September. Although Voronin made no public comments 
in support of Radchenko, the meeting sent a clear message -- the same 
message sent by the customs decision. Voronin is doing his best to take charge 
of Moldova -- all of Moldova. He has a long way to go, of course, and in the long 
run these recent moves may amount to little more than grandstanding. But, 
Voronin clearly has knocked Smirnov off balance, while giving Moldova its first 
taste of power in the Dniestr conflict in many years. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
Region reacts to terror in US 
GUUAM 
On 12 September, the Washington embassies of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan issued a joint statement of condolences and called for 
"joint combat" against terrorism. (www.guuam.org) 
 
Azerbaijan 
President Heydar Aliev expressed condolences in a press release on 11 
September only hours after the attack. Calling terrorism a crime "contrary to all 
human values," Aliev pledged "unequivocal readiness" for cooperation against 
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terrorism. In an unambiguous gesture, Aliev postponed indefinitely a long-
awaited visit to Iran. 
 
Azerbaijan's former National Security Adviser and highly respected elder 
statesman, Vafa Guluzade, remarked that the US could use these sad 
circumstances to reshape the international order. "After the Pearl Harbor attack 
on the United States the country became a superpower. I think the US will collect 
their efforts and take actions which will alter many geopolitical realities and many 
geopolitical concepts. The role of the United States will change too." 
 
Later in the interview Guluzade emphasized the secular Muslim countries' 
support for the United States. "As regards the threat from the Taliban - take 
notice of Uzbekistan. [Uzbek President] Islam Karimov loudly proclaimed that he 
offers all his airports to the US for the anti-terrorist actions. Pakistan said the 
same thing. Turkey will participate as a member of NATO. Clearly no one takes 
threats from terrorists seriously. Some are trying to play the 'Islamic card' as 
though a war between Christianity and Islam was about to begin. This is stupid. 
Clearly, Muslim states support the US - because all normal people are against 
terrorism." (www.echo-az.com, 18 Sep 01) 
 
Georgia 
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze and his most serious political rival, the 
parliamentary chairman, Zurab Zhvania, on 13 September put aside their 
differences to pay a joint visit to the US embassy in order to convey their 
condolences personally. After expressing sadness over the attack on the US, 
Shevardnadze commented that it was the work of "Several reactionary states 
which are fighting against democracy and people's freedom." (GEORGIAN 
TELEVISION, 1000 GMT, 13 Sep 01; via BBC Monitoring) 
 
A representative of the Georgian foreign ministry, Kakha Sikharulidze, confirmed 
that Georgia is ready to provide military bases, air space and intelligence for an 
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anti-terrorism campaign. (PRIME NEWS AGENCY 1025 GMT, 21 Sep 01; via 
BBC Monitoring)  
 
Russian officials and media sought to punish Tbilisi for its willingness to 
cooperate with Washington by intensifying accusations against Georgia for 
sheltering Chechen refugees in Pankisi gorge. Unproven allegations that 
Chechen fighters and bases are located in Georgia have been voiced on many 
prior occasions. This time a new wrinkle emerged when Russian media charged 
that Georgian interior ministry troops were providing safe passage for Chechen 
fighters. The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded with an angry note 
and Georgian television described the incident as a clumsy attempt by Russia to 
portray Georgia as a sponsor of international terrorism. (GEORGIAN 
TELEVISION, 1500 GMT, 21 Sep 01; via BBC Monitoring) 
 
Armenia 
Armenia's President Robert Kocharian offered his condolences and remarked 
that terror must be "destroyed by joint efforts." On the same day he talked of 
expanding military-political cooperation with Russia and deepening its role in any 
Nagorno-Karabakh settlement. (ARMINFO, 11 Sep 01; via BBC Monitoring) On 
14-15 September, Russia's President Vladimir Putin visited Yerevan, where he 
renewed his offer of acting as a guarantor of any potential settlement to the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and signed an agreement formalizing the activities, 
remuneration, and legal status of Russian military advisers and specialists, a 
category distinct from the Russian forces stationed in Armenia. (Jamestown 
Foundation MONITOR, 19 Sep 01) 
 
On 19 September Armenian Defense Minister and Security Council Secretary 
Serge Sarkisian met with Iran's ambassador to Armenia, Fakhad Koleini, to 
discuss matters of regional security. (ARKA NEWS AGENCY, 20 Sep 01; via ISI 
Emerging Markets) The Armenian president plans to visit Iran in November. Also 
on 19 September, Armenian Prime Minister Andranik Karkarian held a meeting 
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with the defense minister of Cyprus, Socrates Asikos. The two endorsed 
deepening the Armenia-Greece-Cyprus "coalition" and expanding cooperation 
between Iran, Greece and Armenia. (ARKA NEWS AGENCY, 19 Sep 01; via ISI 
Emerging Markets) Armenia also had concluded deals to sell arms and 
ammunition to Syria and Lebanon in early September. (ARMINFO, 3 Sep 01; via 
ISI Emerging Markets) The defense ministers of both states are expected to visit 
Armenia in the coming months. Armenia has become firmly bound in military 
cooperation with states that are generally seen as the main sponsors of 
international terrorism. 
 
Chechnya 
Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov expressed condolences in a 12 September 
telegram to US leaders: "Why do we, the Chechens, grieve deeply and sincerely 
with you, America? Because America is the only country in the world today that 
has a tradition of protecting oppressed peoples . A blow against America is a 
blow against peace in the whole world. We regard it as a blow against Chechnya 
and other oppressed nations of the world." The statement was carried by the 
official press center of the Chechen president: www. Chechen.org. In addition, 
these formal condolences were relayed in Washington, DC, by Chechnya's 
representative, Lyoma Usmanov. 
 
Other comments from Maskhadov also were carried on the Chechen.org web 
page: "I am shocked! I simply cannot believe this! Who lifted his hand to commit 
this crime? Is he a human being? Please notify all that we in Chechnya grieve 
together with the American people! I decisively condemn all terrorist acts, and I 
consider that countries that connived in the terrorist acts against the United 
States must inevitably be punished by the world community." (See also 
Chechnya Weekly, 18 Sep 01) 
 
On 18 September the head of the Russian administration of Chechnya, Akhmad 
Kadyrov, arrived in Cairo for the first stop of his Middle Eastern tour. From Egypt 
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he will travel to Syria, Jordan and Iraq. The goal of the trip is to persuade the 
Arabs that "the present war in Chechnya has absolutely nothing to do with 
Jihad." (ITAR-TASS, 18 Sep 01; via BBC Monitoring) 
 
Many English-language news outlets have quoted mistakenly the views of 
Movladi Udugov and his Qatar-based Kavkaz tsentr as representative of 
Chechnya. He came forward on 13 September with the theory that Russia and 
Israel are the most likely state sponsors of the terrorist acts in New York and 
Washington, DC, which, according to Udugov, have diminished the status of the 
US among world powers. "Within minutes Americans lost a feeling of security 
and superiority. The position of the world leader is again vacant." 
 
In his interview Udugov is more careful than the Western media outlets that 
identify him as a spokesman. His title is "Deputy of Shamil Basaev in the Majlis of 
Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan," and he says explicitly "the reaction of the 
Chechen side is contained in the statement by President Aslan Maskhadov." 
Udugov never claims to speak on behalf of Chechnya or the Chechens. 
 
Udugov was President Dzokhar Dudaev's press secretary during the first war, a 
position which allowed him to develop a broad network of contacts among the 
media, which continue to look to him for information. After the first war he served 
briefly as prime minister and foreign minister under Maskhadov but then left the 
government to join the ranks of the radical opposition in 1998. In January 1999 
he joined with other irreconcilable to form the Shura -- a shadow government 
working for the overthrow of the legitimate Maskhadov government. In 1999 
Udugov became deputy to "Emir" Shamil Basaev in the Majlis of Ichkeria and 
Dagestan - it was under the banner of this unofficial entity that roughly 800 
Dagestanis and 200 Chechens staged attacks into Dagestan in the summer of 
1999. After the start of the second war, denounced in Chechnya as a 
provocateur, Udugov moved to Qatar, from where he still runs the Kavkaz tsentr 
web site. In Chechnya, the Maskhadov government has issued a warrant for his 
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arrest. Although Udugov runs interviews with Basaev and implies continued 
cooperation with the Chechen commander, even this flimsy tie to influential 
Chechen circles is open to doubt. Maskhadov's spokesmen have said frequently 
that Basaev is under Maskhadov's command and Basaev has never contradicted 
those statements. (EKHO MOSKVY, 7 Sep 01; via BBC Monitoring) 
 
Kavkaz tsentr has led journalists astray on many occasions, including an incident 
in January 2000 when it disseminated forged documents alleging an imminent 
deportation of Chechens. Some Western news outlets ran the story and were 
embarrassed after it became clear that the story was false. Apparently, that 
embarrassment was not sufficient medicine, since many in the media still have 
not sought out more reliable sources. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
One thing only is clear: Agreement with Russia is the key 
In the days immediately following the attack on America, it looked as if 
Uzbekistan would seek to offer help to the United States, independently of 
Russian influence. Several encouraging statements were received from 
President Islam Karimov's government, including an interview during which 
Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov stated that Uzbekistan would be prepared to 
"Discuss all forms of cooperation" in fighting terrorism. (WASHINGTON POST, 
17 Sep 01) 
 
An objective analysis of the situation in Central Asia would suggest that 
Uzbekistan has the most to gain from an alliance with the United States. 
President Karimov has little love for the Taliban government in Afghanistan, 
which supplies and supports the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The 
IMU has been a continuing source of instability not just for Uzbekistan, but also in 
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the region as a whole. Karimov would be likely to view cooperation with the 
United States as an opportunity to gain support, both military and financial, in 
order to attempt finally to defeat the insurgency. 
 
It is obvious that President Karimov was trying to assert an Uzbek foreign policy 
independent of Russian influence. Uzbekistan has several large bases remaining 
from the Soviet era, including a major airbase at Tashkent and another at 
Termez (which lies directly on Uzbekistan's border with Afghanistan) and could 
offer an attractive alternative to bases in Pakistan. [THE TIMES (LONDON), 17 
Sep 01] 
 
Russia's reaction to Uzbek statements on 17 September was swift. Speaking in 
an interview with TV 6, Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairman Aleksey 
Arbatov claimed that Uzbekistan would only cooperate with America in order to 
gain aid, which it believed had not been sufficiently provided by Moscow. (TV 6, 
17 Sep 01; via BBC Monitoring) Furthermore, a rapidly arranged tour of Central 
Asia by the Russian Security Council secretary, Vladimir Rushailo, was a 
followed by a denial from the Uzbek foreign ministry spokesman, Bakhodir 
Umarov, that the possibility of Uzbek support for US Operations had ever been 
discussed. (RFE/RL, 21 Sep 01) This statement, when viewed together with 
Uzbekistan's entrance into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, was viewed 
as a signal that the indicators of independence in Uzbek foreign policy may be 
disappearing. However, since then Uzbekistan has demonstrated its willingness 
to cooperate with the US. 
 
Whereas the Uzbek government attempted to determine its own response to US 
requests, Tajik President Imomali Rahmonov's statements said only that 
Tajikistan would consult with Russia before responding to any solicitations from 
Washington. Kazakh and Kyrgyz reactions were similar, with both Presidents 
Askar Akaev and Nursultan Nazarbaev stating that they might be willing to 
provide assistance to NATO and the United States, but that they too would 
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consult with Russia before any action could be taken. (BBC MONITORING, 18 
Sep 01) 
 
Clearly this reassertion of authority by Moscow was designed specifically to 
ensure that Russia would be the only party capable of negotiating with the United 
States on the issue of bases, thereby giving Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov 
leverage in planned talks with Secretary of State Colin Powell. 
 
According to press reports, Ivanov informed Powell that Russia would not stand 
in the way of cooperation between the US and Central Asia. (CNN, 21 Sep 01; 
via www.cnn.com) It is clear, however, that Russian support for US retaliatory 
strikes is conditional on major concessions from the Bush administration, most 
probably with regard to Russia's campaign in Chechnya, NATO expansion, and 
possibly National Missile Defense. 
 
While support from Central Asia and Russia may be important to America's aim 
of attacking Osama bin Laden and the Taliban in Afghanistan, particularly with 
respect to overflight rights and air bases, one must question whether it should be 
at the cost of Moscow's reassertion of domination in the region. 
 
Russia wants to ensure that, if the Bush administration wishes to use bases in 
Central Asia, it must negotiate with Moscow, rather than directly with the Central 
Asian heads of state. However, at least Uzbekistan does not agree. 
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